KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism) and DEM (Data Encapsulation Mechanism) were introduced by Shoup to formalize the asymmetric encryption specified for key distribution and the symmetric encryption specified for data exchange in ISO standards on public-key encryption. Shoup defined the "semantic security (IND) against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2)" as a desirable security notion of KEM and DEM, that is, IND-CCA2 KEM and IND-CCA2 DEM. This paper defines "non-malleability (NM)" for KEM, which is a stronger security notion than IND. We provide three definitions of NM for KEM, and show that these three definitions are equivalent. We then show that NM-CCA2 KEM is equivalent to IND-CCA2 KEM. That is, we show that NM is equivalent to IND for KEM under CCA2 attacks, although NM is stronger than IND in the definition (or under some attacks like CCA1). In addition, this paper defines the universally composable (UC) security of KEM and DEM, and shows that IND-CCA2 KEM (or NM-CCA2 KEM) is equivalent to UC KEM and that "IND against adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks (IND-P2-C2)" DEM is equivalent to UC DEM. key words: universal composability,
Introduction
The Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and the Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM) were proposed by Shoup as ISO standards for hybrid-public-key encryption (H-PKE) [10] . The security notion of indistinguishability (IND) (or semantically security) for KEM and DEM was also defined by Shoup. On the other hand, a definition of another stronger security notion "non-malleability (NM)" was introduced by Katz and Yung for private-key encryption (or DEM) and the relations between IND and NM were investigated [6] (their results include that IND-P2-C2 is equivalent to NM-P2-C2 for private public-key encryption).
In this paper, we investigate two stronger security notions for KEM and DEM. One is "non-malleability (NM)" for KEM and the other is "universal composability (UC)" for KEM and DEM.
NM for public-key encryption (PKE) was introduced [1] , [2] , [4] as a stronger security notion than IND and analogous definitions of NM for KEM were introduced in [7] , [8] .
As the NM of PKE have been defined with using a message space specified by an adversary, the existing NM definitions of KEM [7] , [8] use a key space specified by an adversary, which corresponds to a message space of PKE. These existing NM definitions of KEM, however, are available only for a limited type of KEM schemes (e.g., a KEM scheme constructed from a PKE, where a random string plaintext to PKE is a session key output by KEM), since an adversary can specify a very small key space (e.g., {K 0 , K 1 }) but, in a general type of KEM scheme, it may be hard for a polynomial-time machine (an experiment in the NM definitions) to produce a ciphertext along with a key in this specified small key space as the output of the encryption function. That is, the existing NM definitions cannot be used for such a general type of KEM schemes. A weaker security notion of non-malleability, wNM, was introduced and investigated by Herranz et al. [5] . wNM-CCA2 KEM is unlikely to imply IND-CCA2 KEM. Therefore, wNM is not considered to be a feasible definition of the NM for KEM, since a feasible definition of NM(-ATK) should imply IND(-ATK) (ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}).
(In fact, the standard definition of NM(-ATK) of PKE implies IND(-ATK).)
This paper, for the first time, provides the NM definitions that satisfy the following feasible requirements: (1) the NM definitions are available for any type of KEM schemes, in which no key space is used, (2) the NM definitions are stronger than IND (i.e., NM(-ATK) implies IND(-ATK)); for more detailed description on this matter, see Sect. 3.1 and Theorem 4), and (3) the NM definitions capture the naive non-malleable property that the adversary is given challenge ciphertext C * and he should not be able to come up with another ciphertext C such that its decapsulated key K is non-trivially related to the challenge key K * . Here, we introduce three NM definitions of KEM, and show that the three definitions are equivalent.
It is easily obtained from one of the definitions of NM that NM-CCA2 KEM is equivalent to IND-CCA2 KEM. That is, we can now recognize that Shoup's definition, IND-CCA2, for KEM is as feasible as NM-CCA2, whereas NM itself is stronger than IND in the definition.
In addition, this paper investigates the other stronger definitions; the universally composable (UC) security for KEM and DEM. The UC framework was introduced by Canetti [3] and it guarantees very strong security, i.e., preserves stand-alone security in any type of composition with other primitives and protocols.
Although the UC security for KEM and DEM, as the
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ideal functionalities of KEM and KEM-DEM, has been defined and investigated in [7] , [8] , this paper modifies the definition, security proof and description as follows: In the previous definition of F KEM-DEM , only a single shared key was available in the DEM phase. This paper modifies F KEM-DEM to remove this restriction so that a single copy of F KEM-DEM accepts multiple shared keys in the DEM phase. Another problem in [7] , [8] is the proof that UC KEM equals NM-CCA2 (i.e., IND-CCA2) KEM; the proof was based on a previous definition of NM which is, as mentioned above, only available for a limited type of KEM schemes. This paper corrects the proof of the equality between UC KEM and IND-CCA2 KEM, in which we directly prove it without using any NM definition, (it is equivalent to the proof through our new NM definition). In addition, this paper follows the new framework of UC that was totally revised by Canetti in 2005 [3] , while [7] , [8] are based on the original one in 2001. The equivalence between UC DEM and IND-P2-C2 DEM is also proven (through no NM) in this paper, while only a sketch of proof was provided (through NM) in [7] , [8] .
Preliminaries

Notations
N is the set of natural numbers and R is the set of real numbers. ⊥ denotes a null string. A function f : N → R is negligible in k, if for every constant c > 0, there exists integer k c such that
for all k > k c . Hereafter, we often use f < (k) to mean that f is negligible in k. On the other hand, we use f > µ(k) to mean that f is not negligible in k. i.e., function f : N → R is not negligible in k, if there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every integer k c , there
denotes the random variable of A's output on input x. y R ← A(x) denotes that y is randomly selected from A(x) according to its distribution. When A is a set, y U ← A denotes that y is uniformly selected from A. When A is a value, y ← A denotes that y is set as A.
We write vectors in boldface, as in x, and denote the number of components in x by |x| and the i-th component by
We also denote a component of a vector as x ∈ x or x x, which means, respectively, that x is in or is not in the set { x[i] : 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|}. We can simply write x ← D(y) as the shorthand form
. We will consider a relation, Rel, of t variables. Rather than writing Rel(x 1 , · · · , x t ), we write Rel(x, x), meaning the first argument is special and the rest are bunched into vector x with |x| = t − 1.
Key Encapsulation Mechanism
Definition of Key Encapsulation Mechanism
We recall the standard notion of key encapsulation mechanism, KEM, which was formalized by Shoup in [10] . A KEM scheme is the triple of algorithms, Σ = (G, E, D), where 1. G, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that takes a security parameter k ∈ N (provided in unary) and returns a pair (pk, sk) of matching public and secret keys. 2. E, the key encryption algorithm, is a PPT algorithm that takes as input public key pk and outputs a key/ciphertext pair (K * , C * ). 3. D, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that takes as input secret key sk and ciphertext C * , and outputs key K * or ⊥ (⊥ implies that the ciphertext is invalid).
We require that for all (pk, sk) output by key generation algorithm G and for all (K * , C * ) output by key encryption algorithm E(pk), D(sk, C * ) = K * holds. Here, the length of the key, |K * |, is specified by l(k), where k is the security parameter.
Basic Attack Types of KEM
From the standard notion of attack type, we consider the following three attack types of KEM: CPA, CCA1, and CCA2. CPA means "Chosen Plaintext Attacks," where an adversary is allowed to access only an encryption oracle; i.e., no decryption oracle. CCA1 means "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks," where an adversary is allowed to access both encryption and decryption oracles, but the adversary cannot access the decryption oracle after getting the target ciphertext. CCA2 means "Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks," where an adversary is allowed to access both encryption and decryption oracles even after the adversary is given the target ciphertext.
Definition of Indistinguishability for KEM
The indistinguishability (IND) of KEM was defined by Shoup [10] . We use "IND-ATK-KEM" to describe the security notion of indistinguishability for KEM against ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. "IND-KEM" is used to focus on the indistinguishability of KEM without regard to attack type. If it is clear from the context that IND-ATK-KEM (and IND-KEM) is used for KEM, we will call it IND-ATK (and IND) for simplicity.
To clarify the indistinguishability of public key encryption (PKE), we may use IND-ATK-PKE and IND-PKE. Definition 1. Let Σ be a KEM, A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary, and k ∈ N be a security parameter. For ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, Adv Fig. 1 
where Expt 
Data Encapsulation Mechanism
Definition of Data Encapsulation Mechanism
We recall the standard notion of data encapsulation mechanism, DEM, which was formalized by Shoup in [10] . A DEM scheme is the pair of algorithms, Σ = (E , D ), where
1. E , the data encryption algorithm, is a PPT algorithm that takes as input secret key K (K is shared by KEM) and plaintext M, and outputs ciphertext C. 2. D , the data decryption algorithm, is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that takes as input secret key K and ciphertext C, and outputs plaintext M or ⊥ (⊥ implies that the ciphertext is invalid).
It is required that for all C output by data encryption algorithm
Here, the length of the key, |K|, is specified by l(k), where k is the security parameter.
Basic Attack Types of DEM
From the standard notion of attack type, we consider the following nine attack types of DEM: PX-CY (X=0, 1, 2 and Y=0, 1, 2), i.e., P0-C0, P1-C0, P2-C0, P0-C1, P1-C1, P2-C1, P0-C2, P1-C2 and P2-C2.
PX (X=0, 1, 2) denotes access to the encryption oracle. P0 means no access to the encryption oracle by adversary. P1 means "Chosen Plaintext Attacks," where the adversary is allowed to access the encryption oracle, i.e., the adversary cannot access the encryption oracle after getting the target ciphertext. P2 means "Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attacks," where the adversary is allowed to access the encryption oracle, even after it gets the target ciphertext.
CY (Y=0, 1, 2) denotes access to the decryption oracle. C0 means no access to the decryption oracle by adversary. C1 means "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks" where the adversary is allowed to access the decryption oracle, and cannot access the decryption oracle after getting the target ciphertext. C2
where Expt
IND-PX-CY
A,Σ (k) : means "Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks," where an adversary is allowed to access the decryption oracle after it gets the target ciphertext.
Definition of Indistinguishability for DEM
The advantage of indistinguishability of DEM (we use "IND-DEM") following [6] is stated in Fig. 2 Note that, the length of x 0 equals the length of x 1 , i.e., |x 0 | = |x 1 |. Furthermore, when Y = 2, we insist that A 2 does not ask for the decryption of challenge ciphertext y.
Notion of Universal Composability
The notion of universal composability (UC) was introduced by Canetti [3] . This notion makes it easy to introduce definitions of the real life world and the ideal process world and the framework of UC. This UC framework is a little changed in terms of the definition of security of functionality from the first version. (For more detail, see the revised version [3] .) In the real life world, there is adversary A and protocol π which realizes a functionality among some parties. On the other hand, in the ideal process world, there is a simulator S that simulates the real life world, an ideal functionality F , and dummy parties. We consider environment Z which tries to distinguish the real life world from the ideal process world.
The Real Life World/The Ideal Process World
• Let REAL π,A,Z (k, z) denote the output of environment Z when interacting with adversary A and parties P 1 , . . ., P n running protocol π on security parameter k and input z.
• Let IDEAL F ,S ,Z (k, z) denote the output of environment Z after interacting in the ideal process world with adversary S and ideal functionality F , on security parameter k and input z.
The Security Framework of UC
Let F be an ideal functionality and let π be a protocol. We say that π UC-realizes F , if for any adversary A ∈ P there exists a simulator S ∈ P such that for any environment Z ∈ P,
where ≈ denotes statistically indistinguishable in k and P denotes a class of polynomial-time bounded machines.
Three Non-malleability Definitions of KEM
Definition of SNM-ATK-KEM
KEM Σ is called "SNM-ATK-KEM" in the sense that Σ is secure in simulation based non-malleability (SNM) for each attack type ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
be an adversary, S = (S 1 , S 2 ) be an algorithm (the "simulator"), and k ∈ N be the security parameter. For ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, we define Adv Fig. 3 . We say that Σ is SNM-ATK-KEM, if for any adversary A ∈ P and all relations Rel computable in P, there exists simulator S ∈ P such that Adv
where ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2} and P denotes a class of polynomialtime bounded machines.
Note that adversary A 2 is not allowed to pose the challenge ciphertext C * to its decryption oracle in the case of CCA2.
In the previous NM definitions [7] , [8] , the adversary can select the key space. As mentioned in Introduction, it causes a serious problem that the definitions are available only for a limited type of KEM schemes. Therefore, the revised point in this paper is to free the key space of the old version definition in Expt
In the attack scenario of SNM for public key encryption (PKE), SNM-PKE, the adversary can decide the message space [2] . Note that such a message space in the scenario is introduced to make SNM-PKE compatible with IND-PKE (i.e., to make SNM-PKE imply IND-PKE), in whose attack scenario the adversary can decide a pair of messages (a message space).
In contrast, in the attack scenario of IND-KEM, a correct key or a random value along with the target ciphertext is given to the adversary. To make SNM-KEM compatible with IND-KEM (i.e., to make SNM-KEM imply IND-KEM), our SNM-KEM's attack scenario gives the adversary a randomly-ordered pair of a correct key and a random value.
Here
. Two additional minor differences between SNM-KEM and SNM-PKE are:
1. Simulator S also gets access to the decryption oracle when ATK allows it to do so. 2. Relation R utilizes state information s calculated not by
The difference between our NM-KEM and Herrantz et al.'s wNM-KEM [5] is whether adversary A 2 can gain key information X (this includes the order of key K * and a random string R (or another random string R * )) or not. X in our SNM-KEM (and PNM-KEM, CNM-KEM) definition plays a similar role to the message space in the NM definitions by [1] , [2] for PKE.
Definition of CNM-ATK-KEM
KEM Σ is called "CNM-ATK-KEM" in the sense that Σ is secure in comparison based non-malleability (CNM) for each attack type ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. Note that adversary A 2 is not allowed to ask its oracle to decrypt the challenge ciphertext C * in the case of CCA2. The revised point is to free the key space of the old version definitions in Expt
CNM-ATK
A,Σ (k) and Expt
CNM-ATK
A,Σ (k). Similar to SNM-KEM, our CNM-KEM's attack scenario gives the adversary a randomly-ordered pair of a correct key and a random value to make CNM-KEM compatible with IND-KEM.
Definition of PNM-ATK-KEM
KEM Σ is called "PNM-ATK-KEM" in the sense that Σ is secure in parallel chosen-ciphertext attack based nonmalleability (PNM) for each attack type ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
(pk, sk) 
and Note that adversary A 2 is not allowed to ask its oracle to decrypt challenge ciphertext C * in the case of CCA2. The revised point is to free the key space of the old version definitions in Expt
In the PNM definition, the non-malleability property is captured by indistinguishability under parallel chosenciphertext attack such that A 2 outputs a vector of ciphertext C and its decryption result K is given to A 3 .
Equivalence of the Three Non-malleability Definitions
Here, we prove the equivalence of the three non-malleability definitions.
Theorem 1. For any ATK
If C * ∈ C, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return (s 2 , C). 
Theorem 2. For any ATK
∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, if KEM Σ is SNM-ATK-KEM, then Σ is PNM-ATK-KEM. Theorem 3. For any ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, if KEM Σ is PNM-ATK-KEM, then Σ is CNM-ATK-KEM.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove that KEM Σ is not CNM-ATK-KEM if Σ is not SNM-ATK-KEM. More precisely, we show that if adversary A and relation Rel exist such that Adv
is not negligible in k for any simulator S, then there exists adversary B such that Adv
where k is the security parameter and ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary for SNM-ATK. First, we construct a CNM-ATK adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) using SNM-ATK adversary A in Fig. 6 .
From the construction of B, we obtain the following equivalence for all k ∈ N:
We then construct SNM-ATK simulatorŜ = (Ŝ 1 ,Ŝ 2 ) using SNM-ATK adversary A as shown in Fig. 7 .
From the construction of B using A, and the construction ofŜ , we obtain the following equivalence for all k ∈ N: (Rel, k) returns 0. (A problem regarding this note was investigated in [9] ).
The assumption (for contradiction) is that, for any S , 
. From this inequality and Eqs. (1) and (2), we obtain
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We prove that KEM Σ is not SNM-ATK-KEM if Σ is not PNM-ATK-KEM. More precisely, we show that if there exists adversary A such that Adv
PNM-ATK
A,Σ
where k is a security parameter and ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
Let A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) be an adversary for PNM-ATK. First, we construct SNM-ATK adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) and relation Rel using PNM-ATK adversary A as shown in Fig. 8 . Here, we say event Bad occurs iff Y is not an element of X. From the construction of B, we obtain the following equivalence for all k ∈ N:
By Eq. (4), we show that, given relation Rel, for any simulator S , the success probability of Expt
(here b and Bad are independent of g)
By applying Eqs. (3), (4) and the above-mentioned assumption that Adv
, we obtain:
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We prove that KEM Σ is not PNM-ATK-KEM if Σ is not CNM-ATK-KEM. More precisely, we show that if there exists adversary A such that Adv Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary for CNM-ATK. We construct PNM-ATK adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 , B 3 ) using CNM-ATK adversary A as shown in Fig. 9 . From the construction of B, we obtain
That is,
If Rel(X, K), then g←0, otherwise g←1; return g 
By applying Eq. (5) and the above-mentioned assumption that Adv
Equivalence of the Three Non-malleability Definitions
From Theorems 1, 2 and 3, we immediately obtain the equivalence of the three non-malleable definitions, SNM-ATK-KEM, CNM-ATK-KEM and PNM-ATK-KEM. Hereafter, we use NM-ATK-KEM to refer to the three nonmalleable definitions. If it is clear that NM-ATK-KEM is used for KEM, we will call it just NM-ATK.
IND-CCA2 KEM is Equivalent to NM-CCA2 KEM
This section shows that non-malleability is equivalent to indistinguishability for KEM against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2). For public-key encryption (PKE), it has been already proven that non-malleability is equivalent to indistinguishability against CCA2 [1] .
Theorem 4. KEM Σ is NM-CCA2-KEM, if and only if Σ is IND-CCA2-KEM.
Proof. 
UC KEM
Let Σ = (G, E, D) be a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). We define the key encapsulation mechanism functionality F KEM and protocol π Σ that is constructed from KEM Σ and has the same interface with the environment as F KEM . Fig. 10 , and let π Σ be the key encapsulation mechanism protocol in Fig. 11 .
Definition 6. Let F KEM be the key encapsulation mechanism functionality shown in
Here, note that there is no functionality of data transmission between parties in F KEM . Here note that Z corrupts no party and interacts with no adversary. When Z interacts with π Σ , the view of G interacting with Z is exactly the same as that behaving in the real IND-CCA2 game in Fig. 1 . Therefore, in this case (say Real), g = b with probability > 1 2 + µ(k). In contrast, when Z interacts with the ideal process world for F KEM , the view of G interacting with Z is independent of b, since b is independent of (key , cip) generated by Z in step 2 and is independent of the decryption result K † in step 3 (as key and K † are random strings independent of b). Hence, in this case (say Ideal), g = b with probability of exactly
UC KEM Is Equivalent to IND-CCA2 KEM
This section shows that KEM Σ is UC secure if and only if Σ is IND-CCA2 (or NM-CCA2
To do so, we first assume that for any simulator S there exists a real world adversary A and an environment Z that distinguishes with probability > 1 2 + µ(k) whether it is interacting with S and the ideal process for F KEM or with A and π Σ . We then show that there exists an IND-CCA2 attacker G against Σ using Z.
First we show that Z can distinguish (A, π Σ ) and (S , F KEM ) only when no party is corrupted. Since we are dealing with non-adaptive adversaries, there are three cases; Case 1: Sender E is corrupted (throughout the protocol), Case 2: Decryptor D is corrupted (throughout the protocol), Case 3: E and D are uncorrupted.
In Case 1, we can construct simulator S such that no Z can distinguish (A, π Σ ) and (S , F KEM ) as follows: In this case, Z cannot distinguish (A, π Σ ) from (S , F KEM ), because the message returned by S (using A) as E in the ideal world is the same as that returned by A as E in the real world, and (Shared Key, sid, d(C * )) returned by F KEM is exactly the same as that returned by D in the real world.
In Case 2, we can also construct simulator S such that no Z can distinguish (A, π Σ ) and (S , F KEM ) as follows:
1. When Z sends (KEM.KeyGen, sid) to the corrupted party D (i.e., S ), S receives the message and sends it to the simulated copy of A, which returns a reply message (which may be ⊥) to S . S sends it to Z. In this case, Z cannot distinguish (A, π Σ ) and (S , F KEM ), because the message returned by S (using A) as D in the ideal world is the same as that returned by A as D in the real world, and (Key and Ciphertext, sid, key, cip) returned by F KEM is exactly the same as that returned by E in the real world.
Thus, Z cannot distinguish the real/ideal worlds in Cases 1 and 2. Hereafter, we consider only Case 3: E and D are uncorrupted.
Referring to the UC framework, three types of messages are sent from Z to A. The first message type is to corrupt either party, the second message type is to report on message sending, and the third message type is to deliver some message. In our protocol π Σ , parties don't send messages to each other over the network. In addition, we consider the case that no party is corrupted. Therefore, there are no messages from Z to A (and S ).
Since there exists at least one environment Z that can distinguish the real life world from the ideal process world for any simulator S , we consider the following special simulator S :
When S receives message (KEM.KeyGen, sid) from F KEM , S runs key generation algorithm G and obtains public key pk and secret key sk. S sets e ← E(pk, ·) and d ← D(sk, ·), and returns (Algorithms, sid, e, d) to F KEM .
We now show that we can construct adversary G that breaks IND-CCA2-KEM by using the simulated copy of Z which distinguishes real/ideal worlds. To do so, we assume that there is an environment Z such that
We then show that G using Z can correctly guess b in the IND-CCA2 game in Fig. 1 with probability of at least 1 2 + µ(k)/2 , where is the total number of times the encryption oracle is invoked.
In the IND-CCA2 game, G, given a target public-key (encryption algorithm) e and a target pair (key, cip) from the encryption oracle with private random bit b, is allowed to query the decryption oracle, and finally outputs g, which is G's guess of b. G runs Z with the following simulated interaction as protocol π Σ /F KEM .
G acts as follows, where K * i , C * i and R i denote the i-th key, ciphertext and random value of the length l(k), respectively: e), where e is the target public-key (encryption algorithm) for G in the IND-CCA2 game. 2. For the first h times that Z asks some party E to generate (key, cip) with sid, G lets E return (key, cip) ← (K * i , C * i ) by using algorithm e. 3. The h-th time that Z asks to generate (key, cip) with sid, G queries its encryption oracle in the IND-CCA2 game, and obtains corresponding pair (key, cip)
l(k) . Accordingly, G hands the pair of (key, cip) to Z. 4. For the remaining − h times that Z asks E to generate (key, cip) with sid, G lets E return (key, cip) ← (R i ,
* to its decryption oracle, obtains value v, and lets D return v to Z. 6. When Z halts, G outputs whatever Z outputs and halts.
We use a standard hybrid argument to analyze the success probability of G in the IND-CCA2 game.
For h ∈ {0, . . . , }, let Env h be an event that for the first h times that Z asks some party E to generate (key, cip) with sid, E returns (key, cip) ← (K * i , C * i ) by using algorithm e; the h-th time that Z asks E to generate (key, cip) with sid, E returns (key, cip)
. For the remaining − h times that Z asks E to generate (key, cip) with sid, E returns (key, cip)
l(k) . The replies to Z from decryptor D are the same as those shown in step 5 above.
Let H h be Pr[Z → 1|Env h ].We then obtain the following inequality.
Here, from the construction of H h it is clear that
Therefore,
Then there exists some h ∈ {1, · · · } that satisfies
Here, w.l.o.g., let
where Z * outputs the opposite of Z's output bit. In step 3 of G's construction, if G gets the corresponding pair of (K * h , C * h ) (when b = 0), then the probability that Z outputs 1 is identical to H h . If, on the other hand, G gets the non-corresponding pair of (R h , C
where b is the private random bit of the encryption oracle in the IND-CCA2 game and g is G's output (G's guess of b) .
Therefore, we obtain G's success probability, Pr[Expt
That is, Adv
, which is not negligible in k since is polynomially bounded in k.
UC DEM
Let Σ = (E , D ) be a DEM scheme and let Σ be a F KEMhybrid DEM scheme. We define the key encapsulation mechanism and data encapsulation mechanism functionality F KEM-DEM and protocol π Σ that is constructed from DEM Σ in the F KEM hybrid model and has the same interfaces which the environment Z uses to communicate with F KEM-DEM . Fig. 12 , and let π Σ be the KEM-DEM protocol in Fig. 13 .
Definition 7. Let F KEM-DEM be the key encapsulation mechanism and data encapsulation mechanism (KEM-DEM) functionality shown in
Here, note that there is no functionality for the data transmission between parties in F KEM-DEM , and we consider that the algorithm e in KEM.KeyGen of F KEM-DEM outputs different key ciphertext C * . The revised point from the previous definition [7] , [8] is to remove the restriction that the previous F KEM-DEM can have only one key in the DEM phase. To solve this problem, we made current functionality accept the multiple key ciphertexts generated by (DEM.Decrypt, sid, c, C ) in DEM.Decrypt of F KEM-DEM , where c is the ciphertext of a message and C is the encryption of some key. • If e e, or key decryptor D is corrupted, then obtain K and C * by e , record (E i , K, C * , 0) and send (KEM.Ciphertext, sid, C * ) to E i .
• Else, obtain C * by e and K U ← {0, 1} l(k) , record (E i , K, C * , 1) and send (KEM.Ciphertext, sid, C * ) to E i .
KEM.Decrypt:
Upon receiving (KEM.Decrypt, sid, C ) from key decryptor D (and D only), do:
• If C is in the memory (E i , K, C , 1) for some E i and K, record (D, K, C , 1) and send ok to D.
• Else, record (D, d(C ), C , 0) and send ok to D.
DEM.Encrypt:
Upon receiving (DEM.Encrypt, sid, m, C ) from party P, proceed as follows:
• If (P, K, C , 1) is recorded in the memory for some K andP is uncorrupted (P denotes D if P is E i ,P denotes E C i if P is D, where E C i denotes the party such that (E i , *, C , 1) is recorded), then do as follows: 1. Generate c by e DEM (K, µ), where µ is a fixed message, and record (m, c, C ) in the memory. 2. Send (DEM.Ciphertext, sid, c) to P.
• Else if ((P, K, C , 1) is recorded andP is corrupted) or (P, K, C , 0) is recorded in the memory for some K, then do as follows:
• Else, do nothing.
DEM.Decrypt:
Upon receiving (DEM.Decrypt, sid, c, C ) from party P, proceed as follows:
• If (P, K, C , 1) is recorded in the memory for some K and (m, c, C ) is recorded, then send (DEM.Plaintext, sid, m) to P.
• Else if (P, K, C , * ) is recorded in the memory for some K, send (DEM.Plaintext, sid, d DEM (K, c)) to P.
Fig. 12
The KEM-DEM functionality.
Protocol π Σ π Σ proceeds as follows, running with party P ∈ {E 1 , . . . , E n , D} and an ideal functionality F KEM .
KEM.KeyGen:
Upon input (KEM.KeyGen, sid) within key decryptor D, 
UC DEM Is Equivalent to IND-P2-C2 DEM
Proof.
("only if" part) We prove that if π Σ is not IND-P2-C2-DEM secure in the F KEM -hybrid model, then π Σ does not UC-realize F KEM-DEM . In more detail, we can construct an environment Z such that, for any ideal process world adversary (simulator) S , Z can tell whether it is interacting with A and π Σ in the F KEM hybrid model or with S and the ideal protocol for F KEM-DEM by using adversary F that breaks IND-P2-C2-DEM with non-negligible advantage (i.e., Adv
To do so, we first assume that for any simulator S there is an adversary A and an environment Z that distinguishes with probability > 1 2 + µ(k) whether it interacts with S and F KEM-DEM or with A and π Σ . We then show that there exists an IND-P2-C2-DEM attacker F against Σ using Z in the F KEM -hybrid model.
First we show that Z can distinguish (A, π Σ ) in the F KEM -hybrid model and (S , F KEM-DEM ) only when no party is corrupted. Since we are dealing with non-adaptive adversaries, there are three cases; Case 1: Sender E i is corrupted (throughout the protocol), Case 2: Decryptor D is corrupted (throughout the protocol), Case 3: E i and D are uncorrupted.
These cases are done in the F KEM -hybrid model, so Z can't tell whether Z interacts with the protocol π Σ or the ideal F KEM-DEM in the KEM= (G, E, D) phase. The KEM phase in all cases is done as follows: We assume that Z can't distinguish the ideal/real world in the KEM phase of all cases. (hereafter, we discuss all cases after the KEM phase is finished.)
In Case 1, we can construct simulator S such that no Z can distinguish (A, π Σ ) in the F KEM -hybrid model and (S , F KEM-DEM ) as follows:
1. When Z sends (DEM.Encrypt, sid, m, C * ) to the corrupted party E i (i.e., S ), S receives the message and sends it to the simulated copy of A, which replies to S . S then returns A's reply (which may be ⊥) to Z. ) ) since E (i.e., S ) sends no (DEM.Encrypt, sid, m, C ) to F KEM-DEM , which records nothing as (m, c, C ). Note that, S does not receive any message in this step.
In this case, Z cannot distinguish (A, π Σ ) and (S , F KEM ), because the message returned by S as E i in the ideal world is the same as that returned by A as E i in the real world, and (DEM.Plaintext, sid, d DEM (K, c)) returned by F KEM-DEM is exactly the same as that returned by D in the real world.
In Case 2, we can also construct simulator S such that no Z can distinguish (A, π Σ ) and (S , F KEM-DEM ) as follows: In this case, Z cannot distinguish (A, π Σ ) from (S , F KEM-DEM ), because the message returned by S (using A) as D in the ideal world is the same as that returned by A as D in the real world, and (DEM.Decrypt, sid, c, C * ) returned by F KEM-DEM is exactly the same as that returned by E i in the real world.
Thus, Z cannot distinguish the real/ideal worlds in Cases 1 and 2. Hereafter, we consider only Case 3: E i and D are uncorrupted.
Since there exists at least one environment Z that can distinguish the real life world from the ideal process world for any simulator S , we consider the following special simulator S : We now show that we can construct adversary F that breaks IND-P2-C2-DEM by using the simulated copy of Z which distinguishes real/ideal worlds in the F KEM -hybrid model. To do so, we assume that there is an environment Z such that |IDEAL F KEM-DEM ,S ,Z (k, z) − REAL π Σ ,A,Z (k, z)| > µ(k), when Z communicates with the message sending party E i ∈ {E 1 , · · · , E n } and the message receiving party D.
We then show that F using Z can correctly guess b in the IND-P2-C2 game in Fig. 2 with probability of at least 1 2 + µ(k)/2n , where is the total number of times the encryption oracle is invoked and n is the number of all message sending parties E i (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}).
In the IND-P2-C2 game, F, chooses a target message pair (x 0 , x 1 ) with |x 0 | = |x 1 |, given ciphertext y with private random bit b U ← {0, 1} selected by the encryption oracle, is allowed to query the encryption and decryption oracles, and finally outputs g, which is F's guess of b. F runs Z with the following simulated interaction as protocol π Σ /F KEM-DEM in the F KEM -hybrid model.
F acts as follows, where k, , m j , c j , K i , C i , K atk and C atk denote the security parameter, the total number of encrypting messages that Z activates some party E i with DEM.Encrypt, the j-th message, the j-th ciphertext, the key of F' choosing for message sending party E i , the ciphertext of key for E i , the shared key gained by using F KEM between the message sending party E atk and the message receiving party D, and the key ciphertext of K atk , respectively: For some h ∈ {0, · · · , }, Here, we also use a standard hybrid argument to analyze F's success probability in the IND-P2-C2 game.
For h ∈ {0, . . . , }, let Env h be an event that for the first h times that Z asks some party E i (which may be E atk ) to generate ciphertext c j with sid, E i returns m j 's encryption c j according to the above mentioned ways, for the h-th time that Z asks E i (which may be E atk ) to generate ciphertext c j with sid, E i returns m j 's encryption or µ's encryption and for the remaining − h times that Z asks E i (which may be E atk ) to generate c j with sid, E i returns µ's encryption c j . The replies to Z from decryptor D are the same as those shown in step 5 above.
Let H h be Pr[Z → 1|Env h ].We then obtain the following inequality. 
